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It is widely acknowledged that workers in the apparel industry—one of the largest 
employers in the world—often labor under conditions that are unsafe, illegal, and abusive. While 
many people and groups would like to change this state of affairs, only a few institutions have 
the buying power and influence to do so. As a large-scale buyer and seller of apparel bearing its 
well-respected name, Pitt is among this select group of institutions. In the past, Pitt has 
demonstrated its commitment to improving labor standards by affiliating with the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA), a group that monitors labor conditions in factories producing university 
apparel. It is the purpose of this paper, however, to demonstrate that Pitt can better fulfill this 
commitment by affiliating with another organization, the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC).  
The WRC and FLA differ in subtle but significant ways. The majority of the paper is 
devoted to exploring these differences and their implications. After probing some of the general 
issues surrounding labor standards and monitoring, we consider the WRC and FLA‘s 
organizational features. The WRC only accepts funding from affiliate universities, NGOs, and 
government agencies. Though it has strong relationships with apparel brands, the WRC does not 
accept funding from these brands. The FLA does accept funding from the brands it monitors. 
The WRC includes labor rights experts, university representatives, and students on its Governing 
Board. Seats on the FLA Board of Directors are split evenly between brand, university, and NGO 
representatives. 
Both organizations have codes of conduct but these are viewed differently by each. 
Though the FLA has reformed its code of conduct in recent years to bring it into line with the 
policies of the WRC and International Labor Organization, it still contains holes and is put into 
practice ineffectively. For example, the FLA has recently offered forceful arguments in favor of 
living wage provisions (a benchmark the WRC has always worked for). The FLA has yet to 
pressure its affiliated brands to implement living wages in their source factories, however. The 
FLA benchmarks on freedom of association fail to ensure that workers in countries with anti-
union policies will be able to unionize. The WRC has always recognized and advocated for 
workers‘ right to unionize. The FLA‘s Code of Conduct is meant to serve as a checklist for 
monitors auditing a factory; a practice that has proved to be ineffective in remediating root cause 
issues causing labor standards violations. The WRC views codes of conducts as guidelines that 
must be reinterpreted in the context of local conditions.  
Though the FLA commissions more factory audits than the WRC per year, this is an area 
where quality must be given precedent over quantity. The WRC focuses on long-term 
investigations that are meant to fix underlying problems and empower communities to fix labor 
rights issues on their own in the future. The FLA focuses on one- or two-day due diligence audits 
that are meant to check for compliance. Most WRC investigations arise from third-party 
complaints. The WRC only undertakes an investigation if it is desired by workers. The FLA 
mostly uses due diligence audits. It can accept outside complaints but brands are permitted to 
veto the investigation. WRC investigative teams are composed of a combination of locals, labor 
rights experts, and WRC staff. Because of their local connections, all investigative teams have 
appropriate language skills and knowledge of the community surrounding the factory. FLA 
auditors are generally not drawn from the surrounding community. Approximately two-thirds of 
FLA external audits were carried out by monitors from for-profit companies in 2011. Monitors 
are not required to know the language spoken in the area where the factory is located. The WRC 
stresses the importance of conducting worker interviews in places where workers feel 
comfortable to speak freely. The FLA does not require off-site interviews. The WRC provides 
 2 
 
updates on the status of its ongoing investigations and maintains a database of the names and 
locations of factories where university apparel is produced. The FLA does make the results of its 
external monitors‘ factory audits public. It does not make public the name or location of the 
factory where the audit was carried out, however. It is, therefore, impossible to confirm the 
findings of FLA monitors. The results of internal audits carried out by brands are not disclosed. 
Having considered the structure and policies of each organization, we then examine the 
relative effectiveness of the FLA and WRC in improving labor standards. Most of the available 
evidence points to the conclusion that the WRC has been and continues to be better at improving 
the workplace conditions. We argue that FLA‘s close connections with the brands it monitors is 
the main source of its inability—despite ample resources—to carry out its mission effectively. It 
should be emphasized that we do not argue that the FLA is the result of some sort of conspiracy. 
Rather, we argue that brands simply wish to maintain as much control over their operations as 
possible. While this is a rational business move, it may also mean that brands insulate themselves 
from ever making any of the changes that are necessary to improve labor standards. It has been 
the tendency of the FLA to enable this behavior. The WRC, on the other hand, prompts brands to 
think about and act to change the underlying factors that lead to labor standards violations. 
A few recent cases involving FLA external monitors are considered. In June 2012, FLA 
external monitor Accordia Global Compliance Group carried out an audit of the C.J.‘s Seafood 
factory in Louisiana for Wal-Mart. Accordia reported finding no labor violations at the factory 
while a coalition of groups that included the WRC found that laborers at the factory were subject 
to abuse and forced labor. The Justice Department concurred with the findings of the latter group 
and fined C.J.‘s $385,000 last July. FLA external monitors also carried out audits at Tazreen 
fashions in Dhaka, Bangledesh and Ali Enterprises in Karachi, Pakistan. In both cases the 
monitors found that the factories met code of conduct standards. Both factories caught fire in late 
2012, killing several hundred workers.  
Over the past ten years many brands have implemented extensive internal compliance 
programs. Evidence, however, is presented that demonstrates that these programs have, by and 
large, been ineffective in making lasting improvements in labor standards. Much of this 
ineffectiveness can be traced back to the fact that, while brands keep pushing factories to observe 
labor standards, their sourcing departments continue to push the same factories to cut costs and 
turn around orders faster.  
The FLA also carries out investigations based on third-party complaints. While it is often 
several years before these investigations ever result in remediation recommendations, they rarely 
lead to substantive changes. Three of the cases examined are not reported on FLA website at all; 
their existence only came to light after other NGOs decided to air their frustrations with the 
investigations. These less well-known cases are then compared with the FLA‘s prompt and 
positive investigations at factories owned by the Apple supplier Foxconn.  
Special attention is given to the Foxconn investigation because it was well-documented 
by outside groups. One might also venture to assume that, due to all of the publicity surrounding 
the investigation, the FLA put forth its best monitoring effort. The FLA investigation report and 
verification follow-up painted Apple and Foxconn as companies that are making substantive 
efforts to clean up a few minor labor standards issues. Several NGOs and journalists, however, 
found that the opposite was the case. The FLA investigation was carried out during a non-peak 
production period at a small subset of Foxconn factories. SACOM, a Chinese labor rights group, 
found that workers were subject to harassment from managers and forced to sign up to a 
company-run union. Overtime hours in factories producing the new iPhone were far in excess of 
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the Chinese legal limit. Only 10% of workers surveyed were aware of the FLA‘s investigation 
and some of those only knew because their managers had told them to prepare for it. We trace 
these problems—and Foxconn‘s high worker turnover rate—back to the extreme demands Apple 
makes of its suppliers. Rather than confronting these root cause issues, the FLA recommended 
that Foxconn fix a few of the code violations that arise from them. 
Finally, we turn to the work of the WRC. Three cases are examined in detail. In 2007 the 
Russell Jerzees de Honduras factory in Honduras was closed after workers sought to create a 
union. The WRC investigative team uncovered and made public the facts of the case. Russell, 
facing substantive public and university pressure, agreed to enter into negotiations with the 
workers; the WRC acted as a mediator. The two sides were able to come to an agreement and a 
new factory was opened.  
The WRC‘s investigation into the closings of the Hugger and Visiontex factories in 
Honduras offers an example of how the WRC stimulates brands to rethink their duties to 
workers. Both factories closed after their owners fled in early 2009—an all too common 
occurrence in apparel factories facing insolvency. In developing countries with little or no social 
insurance schemes, workers rely on legally-mandated severance payments when they lose their 
jobs. When factory owners flee, however, workers are unlikely to receive these payments. This 
was the case in the Hugger/Visiontex case. Initially the WRC asked Nike—the main buyer at the 
factories—to pressure its subcontractor to pay the severance owed. Nike balked and claimed that 
university-branded products were not made at the factory and, therefore, were not subject to 
university codes of conduct. WRC investigators, however, found that Nike was, indeed, 
manufacturing university-branded products at the factories.  The work of the WRC and 
universities led Nike to take the unprecedented move of paying the workers‘ severance itself. 
The significance of the WRC‘s work on this case can perhaps only be fully appreciated in light 
of later events. When the PT Kizone factory in Indonesia closed under similar circumstance in 
2011, it was Nike that alerted the WRC that the workers had not received any severance. Nike, 
moreover, paid a share of the severance right away. Cases like this show that the WRC‘s 
persistent efforts and close work with both universities and brands does lead to better labor 
conditions for workers.  
With all of this in mind, we can make a fairly simple argument for why Pitt ought to 
affiliate with the WRC. Pitt cares about the conditions under which its branded apparel is made. 
One way to monitor and improve the conditions under which this apparel is produced is to 
affiliate with an labor rights monitoring organization like the FLA or WRC. In choosing to 
affiliate with one or more of these organizations, Pitt should at least affiliate with the most 
effective organization. The evidence presented above and within the paper demonstrates that the 
WRC is indeed the most effective labor rights monitoring organization among those with which 
Pitt can affiliate. Therefore, at the very least, Pitt ought to affiliate with the WRC. 
  WRC affiliation, it should be said, is not a cure-all. It is, however, an important step in 











Apparel sales reached $1.66 trillion worldwide in 2011; second among all consumer 
industries behind only foodstuffs.
1
 In several less developed countries the apparel industry 
dominates the manufacturing sector, accounting for the greatest (if not the majority) share of 
exports. Employment follows similar trends. Apparel accounts for 79% of manufacturing 
employment in Honduras, 40% in Bangladesh, 38% in Pakistan, and 31% in Morocco.
2
 It is 
widely acknowledged that work in apparel factories is often unsafe, uncertain, and abusive. The 
recent garment factory fires in Bangladesh and Pakistan—in which several hundred workers 
died—are only the most visible and tragic cases of a widespread phenomenon; in Bangladesh 
alone more than 700 garment workers have died in the past decade.
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The recognition that most apparel worn in the Global North is sourced from countries and 
factories whose labor standards are uncertain has led, in the past two decades, to the 
development of an anti-sweatshop movement. From the beginning, universities and their students 
have been at the forefront of this movement. As licensers and merchants of branded apparel, 
universities are in an almost unique position to influence the practices of apparel manufacturers 
and labor conditions in apparel factories. Acknowledging as much, in the past decade hundreds 
of universities have formed and affiliated with two labor rights monitoring organizations 
(LRMOs)—the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC)—in 
order to monitor and influence the conditions under which their branded goods are produced.  
The University of Pittsburgh is one such university, having affiliated with the Fair Labor 
Association. In the summer of 2012 the Pitt #NoSweat Coalition Against Sweatshop Labor 
(#NoSweat) was formed with the intent of reforming the university‘s apparel monitoring and 
sourcing policies. #NoSweat‘s primary purpose is to have Pitt affiliate with the Worker Rights 
Consortium, which it considers to be a more effective labor rights monitoring organization. It 
should be stressed that NoSweat does not advocate forcing consumers to buy ethically made 
apparel.
5
 Through affiliation with the WRC the coalition seeks merely to make more information 
available to consumers of Pitt apparel and to enhance labor standards in the factories where this 
apparel is produced.  
The reasoning behind NoSweat is, admittedly, not apparent from a simple recitation of its 
goals. In direct and indirect communications, Pitt administrators have indicated that they are 
satisfied with the FLA and do not wish to affiliate with the WRC.
6
 The purpose of this paper, 
then, is to make an argument as to why Pitt ought to become a WRC affiliate. This argument is 
simple: 
Pitt‘s cares about the conditions under which its branded apparel is made. One way to 
monitor and improve the conditions under which this apparel is produced is to affiliate with an 
LRMO like the FLA or WRC. In choosing to affiliate with one or more LRMOs, Pitt should at 
least affiliate with the most effective organization. The WRC is the most effective labor rights 
monitoring organization among those with which Pitt can affiliate. Therefore, at the very least, 
Pitt ought to affiliate with the WRC.  
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We take the first three premises as given. Pitt‘s affiliation with the FLA shows that it 
cares about the conditions under which its apparel is made; the latter two premises follow from 
the first. Thus, while the evidence and reasoning behind the anti-sweatshop movement are 
considered in section 2, the majority of the paper is concerned with proving that the WRC is, in 
fact, a more effective labor rights monitoring organization than the FLA. As such, in section 3 
we compare the institutional features and practices of the FLA and WRC. Section 4 considers 
these features and practices critically. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Apparel Industry, the Anti-Sweatshop Movement, and Labor Standards: An 
Overview 
Though the purpose of this paper is to consider Pitt‘s policies concerning labor standards, 
it is necessary to take into account certain general facts and arguments pertaining to the apparel 
industry, the anti-sweatshop movement, and labor standards. This section will provide a shared 
basis of knowledge for examining the FLA and WRC. 
 
2.1. Some Structural Features of the Apparel Industry  
The apparel industry is a vast network of firms, interests, and supply chains that defies 
easy summary. We might try, however, to take note of some key features so as to better 
understand how labor rights monitoring groups like the FLA and WRC fit into the picture.   
We first consider some of the structural features of the apparel industry, especially as it 
relates to university apparel. Consider the consumer of a Pitt t-shirt. For our purposes, this t-shirt 
has two important features. First, it bears the Pitt logo. Second, the underlying garment itself is 
branded by a company such as Nike, Gilden, or Adidas. In order for the brand to sell the t-shirt 
bearing the Pitt logo, it must be licensed by Pitt to do so. This, of course, is where Pitt‘s unique 
ability to influence labor standards arises.  
The t-shirts that are branded and designed by a brand, however, are rarely manufactured 
in a facility owned by that brand. Most brands source their products from contracting factories 
located throughout the world. It is not uncommon for a single brand to source its goods from 
several hundred facilities. It is also not uncommon for a single factory to produce for several 
different brands concurrently.
7
 Another common practice of brands is to hire subcontractors to 
act as middlemen to allocate orders or parts of orders to different factories. This can make it 
difficult for brands to keep track of all of the facilities where their goods are produced.  
With this structure in mind, we define a few general terms that will be used to refer to 
specific actors in the rest of the paper. Consumers refer to the individuals—and not institutions—
that buy merchandise. Universities refer to colleges and universities in their institutional 
capacity. That is, as actors with their own policies distinct from those of the groups of 
individuals from which they are composed. Brands or companies refer to the entities that sell 
products to consumers and source their products from a third party, even when single company is 
composed of several brands.
8
 Suppliers, facilities, or factories refer to both the physical plant 
where products are manufactured and the companies that own and operate the plant, even when 
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several plants are owned by a single entity. Subcontractors are the middlemen that brands hire to 
allocate orders to suppliers.  
 
2.2. The Anti-Sweatshop Movement and its Goals 
The term ―sweatshop‖ first emerged in the first part of the twentieth century to describe 
the American factories where predominantly immigrant workers were ―sweated‖ for profits. We 
mention this bit of history because, as Anner, Bair, and Blasi (2012) show, there have been times 
historically when employers and labor have worked out ways to maintain competitiveness while 
observing labor standards. The modern anti-sweatshop movement, however, is often traced to 
Jeffrey Ballinger‘s 1992 Harper’s Magazine article, which described the poor labor conditions 
he observed in Indonesian factories producing Nike products.
9
 This revelation, along with others 
like it, led consumers in the Global North—especially students—to pressure brands and 
governments to do something about labor conditions.  
In 1996 President Clinton convened the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) to address the 
issue of sweatshops. Composed of apparel companies, NGOs, and two labor unions, the major 
outcome of the AIP was the founding, in 1999, of the Fair Labor Association. The initial policies 
of the FLA, however, were criticized by certain members of the AIP. Key among these criticisms 
were the lack of provisions for independent monitors, workers‘ right to bargain collectively, and 
workers‘ right to a living wage (Mandle 2000).10 The Worker Rights Consortium was founded in 
2000 by a group of labor rights experts, university administrators, and students. Though the 
founding of the WRC was, in some ways, a reaction to the perceived shortcomings of the FLA, 
the founding parties stressed that there was no official WRC position regarding the FLA.
11
 
Similar monitoring organizations were established in Europe. Among these were the Clean 
Clothes Campaign, the Ethical Trading Initiative, and the Fair Wear Foundation. 
Concurrent with the founding of third-party labor rights monitoring organizations, many 
brands began to become aware that their profits would suffer if they were associated with 
sweatshops or other anti-social practices. Rodriguez-Garavito (2005) estimates that 98 percent of 
the world‘s 500 largest companies have codes of conduct and that two-thirds of those codes were 
adopted in the nineties. Several large apparel brands established internal monitoring departments 
and joined the FLA or other industry-sponsored initiatives like WRAP.
12
 The efficacy and, 
sometimes, sincerity of just about all of these industry initiatives have come under fire from 
academics, journalists, and activists.
13
  
Foundational to all of these initiatives is the work of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). The ILO predates the anti-sweatshop movement by several decades; the standards and 
precedents established by the Organization generally serve as the point of reference for all actors 
in the labor rights arena. These standards and precedents may be divided into general categories: 
―(1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the rights to collective bargaining; 
(2) the elimination of forced or compulsory labor; (3) the elimination of exploitative, abusive, or 
demeaning forms of child labor; and (4) the elimination of workplace…discrimination‖ 
(Weisband 2000). As Weisband points out, however, the ILO works mostly at the country level 
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and has no enforcement powers other than to ―shame‖ member countries into compliance. These 
limitations have led to what Dara O‘Rourke has termed outsourced regulation. That is, privately-
imposed, voluntary regulation that ―attempts to create a network of regulators, involving multiple 
stakeholders along global supply chains‖ (O‘Rourke 2003). At the center of outsourced 
regulation are multi-stakeholder initiatives like the FLA and WRC. We detail the policies, 
practices, and relative success of these organizations in sections 3 and 4. First, however, we 
consider several points related to the anti-sweatshop movement in general.  
 
2.3. Critiques and Evidence of the Efficacy and Goals of the Anti-Sweatshop Movement 
 
2.3.1 Ethical and Macroeconomic Considerations 
While stances against sweatshops have substantial intuitive appeal, the movement for 
greater labor standards worldwide has not been without its critics. We take up the arguments of 
these critics here briefly in order to acknowledge their presence, take note of developments in the 
international trade and development literatures, and consider the question of protectionism.  
There is an active literature on the ethics surrounding sweatshops and labor standards. A 
moral argument for a laissez-faire approach to sweatshops is that anti-sweatshop advocates fail 
to take into account the freely-entered contracts between laborers and employers. So long as a 
worker is not forced to enter an agreement, it must be in the worker‘s best interest (cf. Powell 
and Zwolinski 2012). Arnold and Bowie (2003) offer a representative ethical argument for labor 
standards and against sweatshops. Basu (2005) reviews these arguments against labor standards 
and offers several cases where third-party intervention is merited. A review of these cases, 
however, would take us far afield from the purpose of this paper.
15
 What might be said here, 
though, is that this objection emphasizes the importance of ensuring that any labor standards 
intervention is carried out in concert with the affected parties, namely, workers and management. 
It is not enough, in other words, for consumers in developed countries to demand goods 
produced in facilities with high labor standards; there must also be a demand on the part of 
workers for these standards. While the high incidence of worker-filed complaints suggests that 
this demand for high standards exists among workers, we must nonetheless tread carefully to 
ensure that monitoring interventions preserve the decision-making autonomy of workers. We 
return to this theme in discussing the monitoring policies of the FLA and WRC in section 3.  
The most basic economic critique of the anti-sweatshop movement and labor standards in 
general can be summarized by the saying, ―Either you believe that demand curves are downward 
sloping or you don‘t.‖16 The implication of such a phrase as this is that, as the costs of production 
rise, the cost of the final good rises, leading to a lower demand for the good. Lower demand for 
the good generates a lower demand for labor. Thus, those in the global North who insist on 
raising labor standards (which is assumed to be a costly task) are, in fact, hurting the very people 
they are trying to help. Similar arguments have been made by Nicholas Kristof and Paul 
Krugman.
17
 Other writers are apprehensive towards ―social clauses‖ in trade agreements 
(Bhagwhati [1995], Brown et al [2004]).  Without a doubt, these writers are well-meaning and 
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seek only to ensure that the moral revulsion felt by people in the Global North towards laboring 
conditions in the Global South are channeled in productive directions. 
Recent analysis and empirical evidence, however, has led to a refinement of these 
previous views. In an influential study, Elliot and Freeman (2003) emphasize the need for 
regulations to protect both capital and labor in the process of trade liberalization. They view the 
arguments commonly made in favor of intellectual property rights to be equally applicable to 
labor standards; while neither has the potential to increase net global welfare, both are necessary 
from the point of view of inadequate national laws and practices.   
Empirical investigators have also failed to find evidence that labor standards have 
significant negative effects on workers. The evidence is reviewed by Freeman (2009) and 
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2011). With regard to minimum wage regulations the evidence 
suggests that (1) minimum wages are mostly binding (2) they have modest effects on 
employment (3) reservation wages may be based on minimum wages and (4) wage rates do not 
necessarily reflect worker productivity.
19
 Mandated benefits (e.g. safety) are found to have 
similarly modest effects. Unions and other labor institutions are associated with higher wages 
and lower turnover but their effects on productivity and profits vary by country. There exists no 




There appears to be no great tradeoff, then, between labor standards and economic 
development. Indeed, as Brown Deardorff, and Stern (2011) write, ―There is a variety of 
empirical evidence available that suggests that the implementation of labor standards in practice 
generally has a positive effect on international trade and investment.‖  
One of the initial concerns of economic commentators was that the drive for greater labor 
standards was, in fact, veiled protectionism.
21
 For better or worse, the majority of the anti-
sweatshop movement, especially students, are focused on ameliorating labor conditions in 
developing countries, not on helping domestic workers. In light of the evidence just presented, 
moreover, it is clear that advocating for labor standards would not return apparel jobs to 
developed countries. A second point to consider is that, relative to the skills of the U.S. labor 
force, apparel manufacturing jobs are low skilled. In the U.S., then, apparel manufacturing jobs 
fall into the subset of plentiful but relatively low paying jobs. The U.S. simply doesn‘t have a 
comparative advantage in apparel manufacturing. When labor standards are observed, however, 
apparel manufacturing can be an important source of income growth for both individual workers 
in and the economy of a developing country.  
 
2.3.2. Microeconomic Considerations  
There also exists a micro-level literature that sheds light on questions such as the 
effectiveness of monitoring, the effectiveness of activist versus national reform of factories, and 
consumers‘ demand for ethically-made products. Though we will take back up the question of 
effective monitoring in greater detail when comparing the WRC and FLA, it is worth asking 
from the outset whether factory monitoring can ever lead to sustained changes in workplace 
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conditions. One can easily imagine a situation, for example, where a factory puts on a show of 
exhibiting good practices for monitors only to revert back to poor practices the minute the 
monitors are out the door. More than this, even if a factory does make real changes to its 
workplace policies, it would seem to be impossible to ensure that these would be maintained 
over the long term. Finally, a monitoring intervention may have a negative outcome if the wrong 
fixes are prescribed by the monitors. This may be the case if, for example, an observed safety 
violation leads the monitoring team to demand that the factory buy costly safety equipment 
without considering less-costly alternatives.  
Without a doubt, all of the problems mentioned above do occur in the course of 
monitoring. The question that we must consider for now is whether there exist monitoring 
methods that avoid these problems. A 2006 report commissioned by the Ethical Trading 
Initiative, a UK group, found that monitoring alone positively affected labor standards relating to 
safety, child labor, working hours, and minimum wage. Monitoring was less effective in areas 
relating freedom of employment, freedom of association, discrimination, regularity of 
employment, and worker abuse (Barrientos and Smith 2006). Though these areas of 
improvement are important, the inability of monitoring alone to protect workers‘ freedom of 
association should be of special concern. Elliott and Freeman (2004) argue that freedom of 
association and collective bargaining is the key ―enabling right‖ for workers; that is, the right 
that would allow workers ―to decide for themselves what issues to pursue, trade-offs to make, 
and battles to conduct with their employers.‖  
It is possible to monitor and improve all aspects of labor standards, including those 
covering enabling rights. The work of Richard Locke and his coauthors shows that, when the 
correct monitoring and remediation policies are pursued, positive and lasting change can be 
achieved. More specifically, they find that complementing a traditional monitoring program 
based on Code of Conduct compliance with long-term engagement, information-sharing, and a 
commitment to working with (rather than simply policing) facilities all led to better labor 
conditions (Locke, Amegual, and Mangal [2009], Locke and Romis [2010], Locke, Qin, and 




A second, related question to take up is the effectiveness of changes in national policy 
towards labor standards—such as those enacted to satisfy trade agreements—relative to non-
governmental factory-level monitoring. Harrison and Scorse (2006) compare the effect of 
changes to minimum wage laws and anti-sweatshop activism in Indonesia in the nineties. They 
find that both measures had the effect of increasing wages but that activist-triggered wage 
increases in the apparel industry resulted in steady employment while the minimum wage laws 
adversely affected employment. Though Harrison and Scorse are unable to identify a single 
cause for this differential impact, they suggest that the relatively low wages in the apparel 
industry before the changes, as well as exporting companies‘ higher margins and desire to 
protect brands, may be responsible.  
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From the perspective of actors in the developed world, these results suggest two 
conclusions. First, activism—especially in the form of direct pressure on brands—can play a 
constructive role in increasing labor standards in LDCs. Second (and more generally) they 
suggest that interventions at the level of international trade should, at the very least, be 
complemented by micro-level interventions that take into account local and factory-specific 
factors. The second conclusion illustrates the need for independent monitoring organizations, the 
first the need for vigilant and informed consumers.  
This brings us to a final, crucial consideration: do consumers even care about labor 
rights? While the above discussion of worker autonomy clearly showed that consumer demand 
for labor standards is not a sufficient condition for labor standards, few would hold that they are 
not necessary. Recent field studies utilizing quasi-experimental methods find that consumers are, 
in fact, willing to ―put their money where their mouth is‖ and pay a premium for ethically made 
goods.
24
 In one experiment Hiscox et al (2011b) found that shirts labeled as being ethically made 
fetched a 45% premium on Ebay relative to their unlabeled counterparts. In-store labeling 
experiments find that apparel labeled as being ethically produced experiences higher sales, can 
be sold at a premium, and increases brand share (Hiscox and Smyth [2011a], Hainmueller and 
Hiscox [2012]).
25
  These studies point to the same conclusions as surveys of large samples of 
consumers, namely, that there is a large, though latent, demand for labor standards among 
consumers in the Global North.
26
 The absence (for the most part) of product differentiation along 
this parameter, however, makes it impossible for consumers to reveal those preferences.  
Having considered some of the general facts and arguments surrounding the apparel 
industry, the anti-sweatshop movement, and labor standards, we might hope to establish and 
summarize a few conclusions to draw on later. Universities can influence apparel brands through 
their licensing agreements but supplier factories are rarely owned by the brand. Substantial 
evidence exists suggesting that trade liberalization can lead to poor labor standards and that 
higher labor standards need not necessarily conflict with the pace of development. Not all 
monitoring undertaken to enhance labor standards is created equal, however.  Specifically, 
monitoring that is overly focused on policing for Code of Conduct compliance is sub-optimal at 
best and counterproductive at worst.
27
 Activism can play a constructive role in furthering labor 
standards, especially by supplying information to consumers. Studies show, moreover, that 
consumers in developed countries do demand labor standards and are willing to pay a premium 
for them.  
 
3. The Fair Labor Association and Worker Rights Consortium: A Comparison 
Here we narrow our focus to the FLA and WRC. This section compares the stated 
policies and practices of the two groups while the next focuses on evidence related to their 
effectiveness in improving labor standards. We structure the discussion to highlight 





3.1. Organizational Features 
Founded in 1999 in response to public and governmental pressure, the Fair Labor 
Association is a 501(c)3 non-profit backed by companies, universities and civil society 
organizations. The Worker Rights Consortium, also a 501(c)3 non-profit, was founded in 2000 
by a coalition led by the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), the Union of 
Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE) along with a group of universities, 
NGOs, and unions. Both organizations are members of the Jo-In project, a collaboration between 
LRMOs that began in 2003 to improve to improve monitoring efforts.
28
 
The WRC seeks "to combat sweatshops and protect the rights of workers who make 
apparel and other products." Though, in the past, it has carried out investigations in factories 
producing a variety of goods, its "primary focus is the labor practices of factories that make 
university-related apparel."
29 
The majority of the FLA‘s monitoring operations are in the apparel 
industry. More recently it has begun to do monitoring in the agriculture and consumer electronics 
sectors as brands that sell those types of goods have affiliated with the Association.
30
  
The institutions affiliated with each organization vary accordingly. There are currently 
180 colleges and universities affiliated with the WRC.
31 
The FLA lists 172 member universities 
on its website. While the WRC accepts only university affiliates, thirty-seven corporations—
mostly in the apparel industry—and five civil service organizations are affiliated with the FLA.32 
The governing bodies of each, then, vary in subtle but significant aspects. The WRC governing 
board has five representatives from affiliate schools, five independent labor rights experts, and 
five student representatives from USAS. The Board of Directors of the FLA is composed of a 
chair, six corporate representatives, six university representatives, six NGO representatives, and 
the Association‘s general counsel.33  
The FLA derives its funding from its corporate and university affiliates. FLA university 
affiliates pay dues of 1% (up to $50,000) of licensing fees per year. Member brands must pay 
minimum dues of $5,000 per year and must fund the monitoring that occurs at their supplier 
facilities.
34
 The WRC funds the majority of its operations with dues from affiliate universities 
and has the same fee structure as the FLA (1% or $50,000 of licensing revenue). NGO and 




Each organization sets out requirements for its university affiliates. The WRC requires 
affiliates to adopt a manufacturing Code of Conduct consistent with the guidelines that will be 
discussed in section 3.2. Additionally, universities must furnish the WRC with a list of names 
and locations of all factories that produce university goods.
36
 FLA university affiliates, though 
not required to adopt a manufacturing Code of Conduct, are required to provide the FLA with a 
list of licensees. Each university licensee is, in turn, categorized based on its annual revenue. The 
FLA sets out different requirements for each licensee based on its categorization; the licensee 







3.2. Codes of Conduct 
The Codes of Conduct adopted by each organization reflect the guidelines followed by 
monitors in the field. The discussion in 2.3.2, however, suggests that the letter of any given code 
is less important than the way it is operationalized. Thus, we consider both the features of the 
Codes of Conduct of the FLA and WRC as well as their use and interpretation.  
The FLA's October 2011 revision to its Code of Conduct and Benchmarks for 
Compliance brings the policies of the organization closer in line with those of the ILO and the 
WRC. We begin by taking note of the broad areas where the WRC and FLA codes have always 
concurred before considering traditional differences. Both require that all employment voluntary 
and that workers be at least 15 years of age. Harassment and discrimination of all forms are 
prohibited and a healthy and safe working environment is required. A 48 hour standard work 
week is required. Any overtime work must be consensual and workers must be compensated at a 
premium. Women have the right to receive equal treatment; they may not be punished for taking 
maternity leave and may not be forced to use contraceptives. Both make allowances for local law 
(in cases where it is stricter than the minimum set out by the code) and for country-specific 
recommendations made by the ILO.
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Traditional policy differences between the FLA and WRC center on freedom of 
association and wages.
39
 The FLA has made some progress in narrowing this gap to better reflect 
the recommendations of the ILO but it is still not as strong as the WRC code. The WRC model 
charter for affiliates
40
 unambiguously states that the all employees have the right to associate and 
bargain collectively. Workers shall not be subjected to harassment, intimidation, or retaliation as 
a result of efforts to associate or bargain collectively. Suppliers are prohibited from cooperating 
with state agencies to prevent workers from freely organizing and may not block organizers' 
access to employees. If workers choose to associate with a union, the supplier must recognize it 
as the employees‘ choice.41 
Amendments to the FLA charter in recent years have brought its Compliance 
Benchmarks into line with that of the WRC. A gap remains, however. No provision requires 
employers to recognize the association freely chosen by the workers. Rather, employers are only 
required to ―bargain with any union that has been recognized by law or by agreement between 
the employer and that union."
42
 That is, unless a union or employee association is recognized by 
the state, the employer is free to bargain with only those unions or associations with which it 
chooses to do so. In countries where official policy seeks to suppress free association, then, 
employers may disregard (though not suppress) union activity while maintaining FLA 
compliance. Thus, the recent amendment to the Compliance Benchmarks recognizing workers' 
right to organize by alternative means when freedom of association is legally restricted need not 
have any practical effect. 
The FLA also changed it wage standards to bring them closer in line with those of the 
ILO and WRC. Both of these latter groups advocate forms of a living wage. The WRC defines a 




―take home‖ or ―net‖ wage, earned during a country‘s legal maximum work week, 
but not more than 48 hours. A living wage provides for the basic needs (housing, 
energy, nutrition, clothing, health care, education, potable water, childcare, 
transportation and savings) of an average family unit of employees in the garment 
manufacturing employment sector of the country divided by the average number 
of adult wage earners in the family unit of employees in the garment 




From its founding to 2011, the FLA only required its affiliates to pay the greater of the 
local minimum wage or the prevailing industry wage.
44
 As of 2011, however, the FLA reversed 
this policy, and called for the gradual adoption of wages that ―meet workers‘ basic needs and 
provide some discretionary income."
45
 In a press release the FLA stated, ―Even if a factory pays 
workers the national minimum wage and meets other legal requirements...it may nevertheless 
have unfair wages because of undue disparities in wages within the enterprise or because wages 
may not reflect worker productivity."
46
 Though this is, no doubt, a promising development, it 
seems that the FLA regards living wages to be only a praiseworthy goal.
47
 For example, a living 
wage recommendation was absent from the FLA‘s investigation at Foxconn, the Apple supplier, 
which is discussed in section 4.3.3.  
Having examined the letter of each Code, it remains to consider their uses. The FLA 
Workplace Code of Conduct and Benchmarks of Compliance is a substantial document that seeks 
to detail all aspects of FLA compliance. The preamble of the code makes clear the relation of 
affiliated brands and university licensees to the code:  
 
Companies affiliated with the FLA are expected to comply with all relevant and 
applicable laws and regulations of the country in which workers are employed and 
to implement the Workplace Code in their applicable facilities... The FLA 
monitors compliance with the Workplace Code by carefully examining adherence 
to the Compliance Benchmarks and the Principles of Monitoring. The 
Compliance Benchmarks identify specific requirements for meeting each Code 
standard, while the Principles of Monitoring guide the assessment of compliance. 
The FLA expects affiliated companies to make improvements when Code 





This approach to the Code makes sense in light of the FLA's use of external (i.e. non-brad 
and non-FLA) monitors (discussed in section 3.3). It seeks, essentially, to set out standards for 
every aspect of the workplace so as to be able to determine the compliance status of a factory. 
Note, however, that this is the same monitoring approach Barrientos and Smith (2006) found was 
ineffective at promoting enabling rights.  
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 Though the WRC requires each of its affiliate universities to adopt a Code of Conduct 
and publishes a model code of conduct, it allows each university to determine the contents of its 
Code. The lack of a unified Code of Conduct is explained in the WRC Investigation Protocols: 
 
[The] WRC shall not promulgate ―benchmarks‖ or ―checklists‖ that purport to be 
applicable to highly variable local contexts and purport to yield comprehensive 
measures of compliance with the innumerable and complex rights and standards 





For guidance in compliance, the WRC recommends that interested parties consult the 
precedents established by the ILO, domestic and international law, and the compilation of ―case-
by-case interpretations and applications of the rights and standard set out in University Codes.‖51 
 The WRC approach to codes of conduct, then, might be said to reflect the attitudes 
driving English-style legal codes while the FLA might be said to follow a more Roman model. 
The WRC uses codes as reference points that must be continually built on and interpreted in light 
of the input of local stakeholders and affiliates. The FLA Code, while not imalleable, is meant to 
be used as a measuring stick to determine the compliance status of a given factory.  
 The WRC and FLA do not formally certify brands. The FLA does, however, accredit 
the internal compliance programs of participating companies, a topic that is returned to in section 
4.3.2. Moreover, it offers de facto certification to participating brands because they are allowed 
to advertise their affiliation with the FLA. One of the only sanctions the FLA can use against 
brands, in fact, is to deny them the right to identify themselves as being in compliance with the 
FLA standards.
52
 The closest thing the WRC has to certification is its Designated Suppliers 
Program (DSP). Universities elect to be a part of the DSP in addition to affiliating with the WRC 
(that is, affiliate universities are not required to adopt the DSP). The intent of the DSP is to 
ensure that a progressively larger portion of a university‘s apparel is sourced from factories that 
have been found to consistently uphold all labor standards. University licensees, in turn, are 
expected to adopt practices consistent with upholding labor rights such as responsible sourcing, 
fair pricing, and long-term production agreements.
53
   
 While codes of conduct may not be the determining factor of the success of a labor 
rights monitoring organization, they do play a major part in the operations of the WRC and FLA. 
The trend in codes of conduct over the past decade has been for the FLA to amend its code to 
make its standards progressively closer to those adopted by the WRC from its founding. The two 
organizations approach codes of conduct differently, however. The WRC uses its affiliates‘ 







3.3. Monitoring, Remediation, and Reporting Practices 
Factory monitoring is the central activity of both the FLA and WRC. Closely related to 
these factory audits are the remediation programs undertaken to remedy the areas where labor 
standards were found to have been breached. Public reporting also play an important role in 
alerting stakeholders—such as brands and universities—of labor conditions and remediation 
efforts in effected factories. Not all monitoring and remediation is created equal, however. 
Differences in choosing monitoring locations, teams, and objectives, as well as remediation 
policies and implementation, can lead to starkly different outcomes for workers and brands alike.  
First, who monitors the factories? The FLA has no monitoring staff of its own. Rather, it 
depends on monitoring carried out by brands‘ internal monitors and independent external 
monitors. While the FLA has no formal requirements regarding a brand‘s internal monitors, it 
does require external monitors to have no financial relations with the brand and linguistic skills 
sufficient to carry out a factory audit.
54
 Of the 55 independent external audits commissioned by 
the FLA in 2011, approximately 66% of those were carried out by monitors from for-profit firms 
while 18% were carried out by non-profits.
55
 As of 2003 the FLA (and not the brand being 
monitored) chooses the external monitor. 
The WRC, by contrast, assembles a new team for each of its investigations. The WRC 
Investigation Protocols stipulate that an investigative team must include on-site WRC staff and 
community members in the affected area.
56
 Teams may also include local advocates, experts on 
various issues, and representatives from other organizations. In assembling an investigative team, 
the WRC follows a principal of maximum local participation. That is, the WRC seeks to include 
and use the skills of local community members and organizations as much as possible so as to 
both ensure the investigation reflects the goals and needs of the community and to build their 
capacity for reconciling future labor problems.
57
  We will return to the significance of these 
differences in monitoring team composition after considering some of the other important 
aspects of monitoring.  
How do these organizations determine the factories that will be monitored in any given 
year? There are thousands of factories manufacturing apparel; it is simply impossible to monitor 
them all. This is another area where the FLA and WRC‘s differing attitude on corporate 
participation in monitoring is important. The FLA sets out intricate rules classifying a brand‘s 
source facilities as either ―applicable‖ or ―de minimis.‖ Factories classified as de minimis are not 
subject to internal or external monitoring.
58
 Those factories that produce applicable products—
other than de minimis factories—are classified as applicable. An applicable product is defined as 
―a. The Product or Brand that accounts for the greatest percentage of…revenues; b. Any product 
or brand that accounts for more than thirty percent (30%) of…revenues; c. Any product or brand 
which bears the Applicant‘s [i.e. firm‘s] name.‖59 All factories that are classified as applicable 
must be examined by the brand‘s internal monitoring team within the first two years of affiliating 
with the FLA. Five percent of the brand‘s applicable factories will be chosen annually by the 
FLA to be monitored by external monitors. These factories are chosen based on their past record 
of labor standards compliance, the record of labor standards in the country where the factory is 
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located, and the size of factory (both in terms of employment and the percentage of the brand‘s 
products sourced from the factory).
60
  
Besides these routine audits, the FLA also fields complaints from third parties and 
undertakes independent investigation on its own initiative.
61
  With the exception of independent 
external monitors that have audited the factory in question within the past six months, anyone 
may file a complaint. In deciding whether to pursue a complaint, the FLA considers the past 
record of the complainant as well as the input of experts and independent external monitors. One 
feature of the complaint process worth noting is that the brand has the ability to terminate the 
complaint investigation process. If the brand agrees to field the complaint, it must implement a 
remediation plan. If the brand decides to terminate the complaint the FLA is not required to 
publicly disclose the existence or termination of the complaint.
62
    
As the WRC does not affiliate with brands, it does not undertake due diligence audits. 
Instead, WRC investigations are either triggered by third-party complaints or undertaken 
proactively. Anyone may file a complaint with the WRC; it need only specify the facts of the 
situation, not the specific provisions of a code that have been breached. The WRC may 
undertake a spot investigation, a process that is similar to the factory audits the FLA 
commissions. Systematic investigations involving long-term engagement in the factory and 
community, however, are more common. The decision to proceed with an investigation rests 
with the WRC governing board and executive director. To trigger an investigation a complaint 
must, at minimum, ―[constitute] a non-trivial violation of University Codes of Conduct…or there 
is good cause, based on the WRC‘s objectives and principles, to investigate whether there is such 
reasonable cause in a particular facility or category of facilities.‖63 Further, evidence must exist 
that the affected workers desire an investigation. In deciding whether (and how) to investigate, 
the WRC will also take into account the severity, importance, and pervasiveness of the alleged 
violation. Other factors considered include the probability that an investigation will result in 




What are the characteristics of the actual monitoring process of each organization? Both 
use a combination of interviews and workplace and records inspection to monitor a facility. Keys 
to the success of an audit are the monitors‘ language skills, familiarity with local conditions, and 
ability to detect problems. Since WRC investigation teams are required to include local 
organizations, experts, and in-region staff, language barriers are not an issue. Though the FLA 
does attempt to employ monitors with language skills, it does not mandate that its external 
monitors have local language knowledge. It states that ―it may be appropriate to engage 
interpreters for discrete tasks.‖65 The WRC‘s partnerships with local groups also gives it an 
advantage in understanding local conditions and actors. The FLA requires that its external 
monitors engage at least two local groups in the course of an audit.
66
 Because the FLA engages 
different external monitors for each individual audit, however, the monitor must both find 
reliable local groups and familiarize itself with local conditions at the outset of every audit. 
Given the time constraints of monitors, the often-complicated web of competing groups in any 
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given area, the possibility that locals keep quiet out of fear of retaliation, and potential language 
constraints, this is no small task. Finally, there is the challenge of broad issue detection. That is, 
it is important for monitors to detect general areas of potential problems so as to at least have a 
direction in monitoring. As the WRC works mostly on third party complaints (and local desire 
for an investigation is a necessary condition of an investigation) all investigations have a raison 
d’être from the outset. The majority of the FLA‘s audits, on the other hand, are carried out on a 
due diligence basis. It is mostly up to monitors, then, to identify potential issues. From the outset, 
therefore, FLA external monitors are at a disadvantage compared to WRC investigation teams, 
which have better language skills, local knowledge, and knowledge of potential problems. While 
this certainly does not mean that FLA external monitors are incapable of identifying areas of 
non-compliance, it would seem to reduce the probability that they will be able to identify the root 
cause issues that are at the bottom of individual infractions. 
The tasks of monitoring for each organization are much the same with a few notable 
exceptions. Both review relevant company records for evidence of wage, workweek, and other 
standards. Facility inspections are also standard. Both emphasize the need for structured and 
unstructured interviews with workers. These interviews ought to be confidential and all efforts 
should be made to ensure that the interviewee suffers no retaliation. The sample of interviewees 
should be representative of the population of workers. One area of difference between the two is 
the importance they place on off-site formal interviews. While the WRC emphasizes the 
importance of finding areas where workers feel safe to speak freely—such as their home—the 
FLA leaves it to the discretion of monitors to decide whether off-site interviews are needed.
67
 
This is an important divergence in policy. Workers may only feel free to speak freely outside of 
the workplace. Off-site interviews, however, are time-consuming to arrange and conduct and, 
thus, may be foregone by a time-constrained monitor.  
How does each organization go about remediating problems found in the course of 
monitoring? The FLA requires its monitors to provide a report of non-compliance subsequent to 
each audit. Within sixty days, the sourcing brand (and not the supplier) is required to provide a 
report detailing the steps taken to remedy areas of non-compliance. The FLA then analyzes the 
plan.
68
 The FLA also undertakes verification audits at select facilities some years after the initial 
audit to determine the effectiveness of the remediation program.
69
  
The WRC, by contrast, undertakes long-term investigations aimed at ensuring labor 
issues are fully resolved. In addition to offering remediation recommendations to the facility, the 
WRC also reports to the brands that source from the factory on issues that were found. It should 
be emphasized that, though the WRC does not accept funding from brands, it does have positive 
working relationships with them. The WRC will work with brands to remediate problems so long 
as the brand is willing to aid in bringing about necessary changes. If a brand will not cooperate 
with the WRC, it will still work with local stakeholders and other NGOs to ensure that the 
problems identified are remediated.
70
 
If the facility does not make the recommended changes and sourcing brands are unwilling 
to press the facility to make the changes, the WRC will issue a special report to affiliated 
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universities detailing non-compliance. It is then up to each individual institution to decide 
whether and how they will take action.
71
 The WRC Investigation Protocols leaves it up to the 
investigative team to continue the investigation, including additional workplace monitoring and 
interviews, as it sees fit throughout the process of remediating problems.
72
 As such, WRC 
investigations continue so long as problems go unresolved. Thus, WRC investigations can last 
anywhere from a few months to several years.  
The WRC issues reports to university affiliates whenever a licensee fails to remediate 
problems. In addition to these reports, the WRC maintains a database of factory investigations, 
available on its website, where all investigation updates are posted.
73
 The content and timing of 
the updates are left to the discretion of the investigative team and the WRC Executive director. 
Both the WRC and FLA work to translate reports into the language spoken at the facility 
monitored.
74
 For standard factory assessments, the FLA issues tracking charts indicating the 




The WRC requires all university licensees to report the name and location of the factories 
from which they source their goods. It publishes a database of these factories and their locations 
on its website.
76
 The FLA charter prevents the Association from making any of this information 
public.
77
 When the FLA publishes an auditing report, for example, only the country of the 
factory is reported. It is, therefore, impossible for any of the findings of FLA monitors to be 
independently verified by an outside organization. 
We end this section by restating a few pertinent aspects of the monitoring processes of 
the FLA and WRC. The FLA relies on brands‘ internal monitors and hired external monitors—
the majority of which are for-profit companies—to carry out monitoring while the WRC 
assembles monitoring teams composed of local stakeholders, experts, and WRC staff. The FLA 
focuses on due diligence monitoring of a subset of facilities from which affiliate brands sources 
their products. WRC investigations mostly arise from third party complaints. The WRC‘s 
engagement with local stakeholders allows it to get around many of the language and 
information barriers faced by external FLA monitors. While the WRC stressed the importance of 
off-site worker interviews, the FLA leaves it to the discretion of the external monitors to decide 
if off-site interviews are necessary. The FLA‘s remediation process relies on updates from 
brands a few months after the fact and verification of select facilities several years after that. The 
WRC undertakes long-term investigations that end only when the labor problems observed are 
resolved. The WRC publicly discloses the names and locations of all facilities from which a 
university licensee sources its products. The FLA holds this information in strict confidentiality. 
Beyond resolving labor issues, WRC investigations also aim to empower local actors to resolve 
such issues in the future without WRC intervention. The FLA‘s monitoring procedures do not 






4. The FLA and WRC: Evidence and Critiques 
Having examined the problem of labor standards, the anti-sweatshop movement in 
general and the policies and practices of the WRC and FLA in detail, we may now venture into 
the murky realm of theory and evidence. In doing so, we might hope to reach some conclusions 
on the relative merits of the FLA and WRC. The greatest barrier to such an investigation, no 
doubt, is the lack of verifiable empirical evidence on the effects of the activities of each 
organization. We do, after all, depend on these organizations to discover and distribute 
information on labor standards that would otherwise go unknown. Monitoring the monitors is no 
small task.  
The primary concern of most critics of the FLA is that it relies on affiliated brands for 
funding and admits executives from those brands to its Board of Directors.
78
 This, of course, 
generates a conflict of interest; the brands that were found to be sourcing their products from 
facilities with poor labor standards are now in charge of policing themselves. The counterclaim 
to this charge is that no progress can be made in improving labor standards without the 
cooperation of brands. Moreover, companies that rely on brand recognition cannot afford to be 
associated with poor labor practices—it‘s simply bad business. 
It is undoubtedly true that brands must be involved. The interesting question, though, is 
not whether brands should be involved in improving labor standards but, rather, how and to what 
extent. It is also true that companies don‘t want their brands to be associated with poor labor 
standards. A distinction, however, should be drawn between protecting labor standards as a 
means and as an end. Inasmuch as a brand undertakes action with regard to labor standards to 
preserve its name, the brand views labor standards as a means.
79
 It is possible that, viewing labor 
standards as a means, a brand could undertake actions that result in a net welfare gain for 
workers in source facilities. This is not a unique outcome, however. If a brand can find a less 
costly alternative to improving labor standards, then, assuming it is profit maximizing, it will 
undertake this alternative. When labor standards are a means rather than an end there is no 
guarantee that any improvement will result.  
 
4.1 Analogies and Models for Labor Rights Monitoring 
Set aside labor rights monitors for a minute. Consider accounting firms and credit ratings 
agencies.
80
 Both are types of monitors that provide information to the public about a firm—just 
like labor rights monitors. Accountants are paid by the firms they audit and no one raises an eye. 
Why? The information provided by accountants can be shown to be false rather easily and, 
importantly, blame can be assigned accordingly. For the most part, no amount of money can 
convince an accountant to cook the books; it is simply too costly to be caught. Thus, one has 
good reason to trust the information provided by an accounting audit. 
What about credit ratings agencies? Credit ratings differ from accounting audits in that 
they speak to the entity‘s ability to pay back its debt in the future rather than to its present 
financial condition. Thus, the realization that a credit rating was overly generous does not 
damage the reputation of a rater too much. That is, if an entity ends up being unable to pay off its 
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bonds despite an initial ‗A‘ rating from the credit rating agency, the agency will not go out of 
business or face prosecution. There are, after all, hundreds of factors that could not be foreseen 
when the last rating update was issued. It would simply be wrong to assign all of the blame for a 
poor rating on the rating agency. This fact does, however, create an opening for credit raters to 
engage in less than honest conduct.  
For our purposes we can divide bond ratings into two categories: those that are solicited 
(i.e. paid for by the entity being rated) and those that are unsolicited (i.e. not requested or paid 
for by the entity being rated). In the wake of the financial crisis it is perhaps less controversial to 
argue that firms that issue solicited ratings—such as Moody‘s, S&P, and Fitch—are less 
dependable than those—like Egan-Jones—that do not.81 Indeed, there is substantial empirical 
evidence pointing to the conclusion that (1) unsolicited ratings are lower relative to solicited 
ratings, (2) that unsolicited ratings are adjusted to reflect bad and good news more equally 
relative to unsolicited ratings, and (3) that unsolicited ratings adjust more quickly to new 
information (Poon [2003], Beaver et al [2006]). These observations do not imply by themselves 
that solicited ratings are the result of dishonest conduct. Bruno et al (2011), however, control for 
the expected use of ratings (i.e. for contracts as opposed to investment) and still find significant 
differences between unsolicited and solicited ratings. Fairchild et al (2009) analyze differences in 
ratings between agencies that use private firm information for their unsolicited ratings and 
agencies that only use public information for their unsolicited ratings. They find that unsolicited 
ratings are lower relative to solicited ratings regardless of whether they are based on private or 
public information. From this, they conclude that firms provide incomplete private information 
to ratings agencies that use that information to issue unsolicited ratings. Finally, Becker and 
Milbourn (2011) find that increased competition in the market for solicited ratings led to lower 
quality ratings, suggesting that agencies are willing to bend their ratings to suit their clients. 
From these results we conclude that there is substantial evidence pointing to the conclusion that 
solicited bond ratings are, for a variety of reasons, less reliable than unsolicited ratings.  
Labor rights monitors are best likened to bond rating agencies, not accounting firms. Like 
a company‘s balance sheets, labor standards in a company‘s source facilities are, in principle, 
observable in the present. Unlike balance sheets, however, it is difficult for both consumers and 
labor rights monitors to holistically observe the status of labor rights in a brand‘s source 
factories. It is just as difficult for a consumer to evaluate the quality, impact, and 
representativeness of labor rights monitoring. Thus, while uncertainty in credit ratings stems 
from one‘s inability to see into the future, uncertainty in labor rights monitoring arises from 
one‘s inability to holistically assess the claims of the monitors. That is, when it comes to light 
that a monitored and ―okayed‖ factory actually has poor labor standards, it is all too easy for the 
monitor to claim that the factory represents an exception rather than the rule. Observers have no 
ability to evaluate the truth of the claim. This, in turn, creates the potential for persistently poor 
labor rights monitoring. It is, therefore, imperative that the controlling entities and funding 
sources of labor rights monitors be carefully accounted for.    
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It should be stressed that poor monitoring arising from corporate funding need not be the 
product of avaricious tycoons colluding in a smoke-filled room. We must allow for the fact that 
brands are not necessarily always profit-maximizing, that they are more likely than not staffed by 
people possessing moral intuitions indistinct from the population at large. Nevertheless, 
substantial evidence exists suggesting that the FLA has been and is unduly influenced by its 
corporate backers. It shall be the purpose of the remainder of this section to examine the effects 
of this influence while seeking to understand the channels through which it comes about.  
 
4.2. The Development of FLA Codes and Policies 
The formation of and revision to the FLA charter in 1998 and 2003 provide insights into 
the goals of all FLA stakeholders. During the negotiations that would eventually lead to the 
formation of the FLA, brands advocated for the use of private, for-profit monitors. NGO and 
union participants argued for the use of local monitors, which they believed had more credibility 
in local communities and could undertake ongoing, intensive investigations. Contrary to the 
analogy made between credit rating agencies and labor rights monitors described above, brands 
argued that private monitors acted as accountants. According to this argument, if private 
monitors failed to accurately report what they found, they put their business at risk. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers‘ social compliance group (now spun off as Global Social 
Compliance) was the largest private monitor in the world when FLA negotiations were taking 
place. During negotiations, Nike issued a statement in favor of private monitoring saying, 
―Companies like PwC [PricewaterhouseCoopers] have one invaluable asset: integrity.‖82 
O‘Rourke (2000),83 however, found that PwC auditors failed to find major violations in 
workplace health, overtime laws, wage laws, falsified timecards, and barriers to freedom of 
association. Before the audits, PwC sent the supplier‘s management a questionnaire to prepare 
them for what the auditors would be looking for. When auditors did speak to workers, the 
workers were selected by management, who were then interviewed in the factory‘s offices with 
management‘s knowledge. PwC monitors were observed making verbal recommendations to 
factory managers on strategies to exceed national overtime laws. These observations were 
consistent across both factory visits O‘Rourke accompanied PwC auditors on; the auditors knew 
they were under close scrutiny. O‘Rourke (2000) is unique in his findings only because PwC 
factory inspections are confidential. At the very least, brands were misinformed about the nature 
of the audits carried out by PwC during FLA negotiations.  
In the initial FLA charter, brands gained the right to choose who would monitor their 
source facilities; all audits would be pre-announced. Though the FLA had ultimate authority to 
decide which facilities would be monitored, brands were given the authority to issue a list of 
suggested facilities to be monitored and the FLA was directed to favor these facilities in making 
its ultimate decision.
84
 The subsequent implementation of these provisions led the International 
Labor Rights Fund, a founding NGO, to withdraw from the FLA in 2001. Its executive director 
wrote, ―The FLA was so concerned about offering companies an ‗acceptable‘ monitoring regime 
to attract more companies that it was willing to sacrifice some pretty fundamental points.‖85  
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This discussion brings out two points. First, the FLA emerged from a high-profile 
initiative begun by President Clinton and led by Robert Reich, the Secretary of Labor. Pressure 
to come to some sort of agreement and then to see the FLA succeed was high, as evidenced by 
the ad-hoc inclusion of universities as a pathway to compelling more companies to join the 
Association. Second, brands are naturally (and rightly) weary of allowing outsiders to control 
and possibly expose parts of their operations. Their desire to use private monitors that they are 
familiar with from other aspects of their business, then, should come as no surprise. The result of 
these two factors—along with the superior resources of corporate negotiators relative to NGO 
and union negotiators—was an agreement that disproportionately reflected the goals of brands.86  
Even if brands wish simply to maximize their control over monitoring (and labor rights 
monitoring groups in general) in order to maintain control over their operations, too much 
control can have significant downsides. In the absence of an exogenous shock, organizational 
inertia is a powerful perpetuator of the status quo. While brands may be willing to implement 
fairly painless changes (e.g. hiring PwC), they are less likely to undertake more significant 
changes such as working with local groups to ensure workers have a voice in their workplace. 
Brands‘ control over monitoring makes it more likely that the former will be undertaken while 
the latter will not.  This framework seems to map well onto the negotiations that led to the 
founding of the FLA and to many subsequent episodes. For brands to undertake more substantive 
changes, it is necessary for outside groups—such as the WRC or universities—to push for these 
changes.  
Following its founding, the FLA underwent substantial changes. While the Association 
initially kept all of its monitoring reports confidential, it did release public reports on three 
occasions. Importantly, all of these reports pertained to investigations that were carried out 
jointly with the WRC. The WRC also worked with the FLA on an investigation of conditions at 
the Primo S.A. factory in El Salvador from 2003-2004. The WRC recommended and the FLA 
agreed to help fund an ombudsman to monitor practices such as blacklisting in free trade zones 
in Central America.
87
 FLA affiliate brands, however, objected to allowing the ombudsman to 
carry out his own investigations. Instead, the brands argued that the ombudsman should report 
infractions to the brands, which would handle the claim internally.
88
  
In charter revisions approved in 2003, the FLA did manage to strengthen its policies on 
independent monitoring to a point closer to its present form. Again, however, the FLA was 
forced to make concessions to brands. In particular, the Association reduced the number of 
external audits per year from 30% for the first two years of brand membership and 10% 
thereafter to 5% at all times. Though the FLA attributed the reduced number of external audits to 
a lost U.S. AID grant, brands have always paid for external monitoring.
89
 Thus, this weakening 
in monitoring coverage can be attributed to brands‘ unwillingness to fund external monitoring at 
an unsubsidized rate. A second major concession to brands was the quick accreditation of several 
private external monitors. In particular, the FLA accredited Global Social Compliance (formerly 
PricewaterhouseCoopers), whose application for accreditation had previously been rejected on 
several occasions. T-Group solutions, a monitoring subsidiary of the garment subcontracting 
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firm Triburg, was also accredited. Particularly troubling is the fact that, at the time agreement 
was reached, Triburg sourced garments for FLA affiliate brands Liz Claiborne and Phillips-Van 
Heusen.
90
 While the FLA claims it took steps to mitigate any conflicts of interest arising from 
the accreditation of these monitors, we show below that, no matter the checks in place, the 
incentives of private monitors prevent them from ever being truly independent.  
First, however, we summarize what has been said here. We set up a framework to 
understand why the FLA initially adopted policies and practices that, while conducive to brands, 
did not reflect best practices in monitoring.  In particular, brands insisted on minimal monitoring 
coverage, the use of preferred private monitors, and low standards of transparency. These 
policies were not without consequence. At factories like Kukdong in Mexico, PT Victoria in 
Indonesia, Hana in Cambodia, and many others the FLA failed to take action, maintained that 
labor conditions were adequate (when, in fact, they were not), or missed serious violations. We 
refrain from considering these cases here, however, in order to devote more space to the FLA as 
it exists today.  
 
4.3. The FLA: Recent Evidence on Monitoring Effectiveness 
In 4.2 we only showed that the FLA has, throughout its history, been unduly influenced 
by its brand affiliates. Now, however, we consider how effective the FLA has been at carrying 
out its mission in the past few years. We first take up problems with the FLA‘s current external 
monitoring regime. Evidence on affiliate brands‘ internal monitoring programs and sourcing 
practices is then examined. We conclude with a few case studies. While transparency rules (or 
lack thereof) mean that evidence on all of these topics is scarce, there exist enough dependable 
sources to form what seems to be a fairly complete picture.  
 
4.3.1. External Monitors 
The FLA continues to use a mixture of for- and non-profit monitoring organizations for 
its external monitoring program. In 2011, approximately two-thirds of external audits 
commissioned by the FLA were carried out by private monitors.
91
 Since private monitors usually 
compete for repeat business from brands, they face a similar—but arguably more acute—set of 
conflicts of interest. They generally have a monopoly on information pertaining to labor 
standards in a given factory and, thus, cannot be held accountable for what they do and do not 
report. Since these private monitors are hired to monitor rather than remediate problems and best 
practice dictates that no monitor should be hired to audit the same factory twice, they are not 
well-incentivized to be overly thorough in their audits.    
Though much of the monitoring carried out by FLA private monitors is never made 
public or verified by a third party,
92
 a few cases have come to light that speak to the stringency of 
the FLA‘s external monitors. Accordia Global Compliance Group is an accredited FLA external 
monitor. Accordia also does monitoring for Wal-Mart. In June 2012, the WRC and National 
Guestworkers Alliance released a report detailing abuse, below-minimum wages, excessive 
hours of work, and forced labor at CJ‘s seafood, a Wal-Mart supplier in Louisiana.93 In response, 
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Wal-Mart dispatched Accordia to undertake an investigation. Wal-Mart says Accordia was 
―unable to substantiate claims of forced labor or human trafficking at CJ‘s seafood.‖94 In July, 
however, the Labor Department fined CJ‘s approximately $385,000 for labor violations.95   
Ali Enterprises, a Karachi ready-made garment factory, caught fire in September 2012, 
killing almost 300 workers.
96
 Locked doors prevented workers from escaping the factory, 
windows were barred. The factory was officially registered as employing 250 workers but more 
than 1,000 were employed there at the time of the fire.
97
 In principle, these are the kind of 
violations that an inspector with specialized knowledge of safety and records-keeping can spot 
and change in the course of a one or two day audit; certain experts think it is one of the high 
points of due diligence monitoring (cf. Amenguel [2009]; Barrientos and Smith [2006]). UL 
Responsible Sourcing, an accredited FLA monitor, audited Ali Enterprises three times. After 
finding some fire safety violations in 2007, UL verified that Ali Enterprises had taken necessary 
corrective actions in December 2011.
98
  
Tazreen fashions, a Dhaka, Bangledesh factory caught fire in November 2012, killing 
112 people. UL initially denied that it ever carried out an audit at Tazreen. A cover page of a 
December 2011 inspection report by UL (which was then called STR Responsible Sourcing), 
however, was found in the factory.
99
 In a December New York Times article the company said 
that it had inspected the building but that it was not responsible for ensuring that the factory‘s 
fire escapes and stairwells were adequate. Instead, it claimed that it was the job of the local 
building inspector to ensure that the building was safe.
100
 This argument doesn‘t hold up to 
scrutiny. It is technically the job of the government fire inspector to inspect and ensure the 
building is safe just as it is technically the job of the government to ensure that its laws—
including those pertaining to labor—are enforced. If this ideal was achieved, there would be no 
need for factory audits at all. Since the reality of the situation in many countries is far from ideal, 
however, monitors exist to ensure that, at the very least, these basic safety requirements are met. 
These instances of poor monitoring only came to light after public, catastrophic events. 
While they represent only a small sample of all audits, we have no reason to believe that 
Accordia or UL carried out these audits any differently than they would any other. At the least, 
they show that single day, due diligence factory audits are ineffective at preventing basic labor 
violations. At the worst, they speak to willful negligence on the part of private monitors. The 
FLA‘s extensive use of these private monitors, therefore, should be a cause for concern. 
 
4.3.2. Internal Monitors 
While the FLA commissions external monitors to audit only 5% of brand affiliates‘ 
source factories each year, the brand itself is expected to ensure compliance in all applicable 
(though not de minimis) facilities. Though these internal compliance programs are just as 
secretive as external private monitoring programs, a small batch of case studies provide 
illuminating glimpses into this area.  
Locke, Qin, and Brause (2006) use a unique database of factory audit reports from over 
800 of Nike‘s suppliers. Nike is a curious—though by no means unique—case because, despite 
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having one of the largest internal monitoring infrastructures in the apparel industry, many of its 
source factories continue to be found to have poor labor standards. Locke et al (2006) confirm 
these casual observations, concluding that ―analyses of Nike‘s own data suggest that conditions 
in some of its suppliers have improved somewhat but that in many of them, things have either 
remained stable or deteriorated.‖ More generally, this suggests that due diligence monitoring of 
the type used by internal monitoring programs and the FLA ought to be replaced with different 
strategies.  
In another study, Locke, Amengual, and Mangal (2009) examined the internal monitoring 
efforts of ABC, an unnamed, multi-billion dollar apparel firm. ABC is affiliated with the FLA 
and its internal monitoring program is accredited by the Association. They are considered to be a 
leader in corporate social responsibility. An examination of the compliance status of ABC source 
facilities, however, reveals that the firm sourced 53% of its products from facilities that were 
explicitly not approved by the company‘s internal compliance monitors; only 24% were 
approved. The remaining 26% of facilities were either ―in progress‖ towards compliance or 
―required follow-up‖ to assess compliance. If a factory is not approved by monitors, then some 
combination of ―terminal,‖ ―significant,‖ and/or ―minor flaws‖ of ABC‘s Code of Conduct were 
found by monitors. In principle, this means that orders to the factory should be placed on hold 
until compliance could be verified.  
ABC‘s monitoring staff was found to be stretched thin and lacking the training necessary 
to do audits. They carried out hurried, day-long audits and monitors recognized that they missed 
violations. One monitor was quoted as saying that he ended his audits after recording the first 
forty violations he encountered. Monitors were more likely to report safety and records-keeping 
violations than harassment, illegal firings, or problems with pay. Even though the monitoring 
team was putting in a good-faith effort, it was found that other parts of the company oftentimes 
made compliance difficult: ―sourcing departments continue to squeeze factories on price, 
compress lead times, and demand high-quality standards.‖ As evidenced by the statistics 
presented above and confirmed qualitatively in the paper, sourcing departments placed orders 
with factories without regard to monitoring reports. Thus, while factories are told to comply with 
ABC‘s Code of Conduct, ABC‘s sourcing practices implicitly encourage suppliers to follow 
practices that commonly lead to code violations. ABC may have a legitimate concern for labor 
rights. It is not, however, willing to systematically change its operational practices to improve 
labor standards in its own source factories. Since the FLA considers ABC‘s compliance program 
to be one of the best in the industry, one may infer that the programs of other brands are on par 
or worse than ABC‘s.  
Amengual (2009) investigates the internal monitoring program of another FLA brand in 
the Dominican Republic. This firm, which we‘ll call XYZ,101 also sources apparel from hundreds 
of factories across the world. Monitors for XYZ were stretched for time, spending the majority 
of their annual factory visit reviewing factory documents. While this may be an effective tool for 
finding hours and wage violations, the success of such a process depends on the honesty of 
factory management. Monitors also toured the factory, looking for safety violations. While XYZ 
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monitors did attempt to help managers with strategies for compliance, sometimes their 
recommendations paper over more serious problems in the work environment.
102
 Monitors spent 
the least amount of time talking to workers. Workers, however, were often unwilling to talk to 
brand monitors, despite efforts by the monitors, out of fear of that they would be fired if they 
reported violations.
103
 Workers‘ fear of losing their jobs from talking to XYZ monitors is not 
unfounded. One of XYZ‘s only courses of action to force a factory into compliance is to make a 
credible threat to cut off orders—XYZ has no program in place to reward compliant factories. 
The result of this, however, is that problems relating to harassment, bargaining, and days off are 
rarely detected.  
These three examples of leading FLA affiliate brands shows that, despite implementing 
large internal compliance programs, brands have been unsuccessful in improving the conditions 
under which their products are made. The latter two cases suggest that two major factors 
contribute to this result. First, internal monitors are often unable to carry out in-depth factory 
audits. They focus on easily-observable violations but spend little time on problems related to 
enabling rights—those rights that would allow workers to bargain for a safe and equitable 
workplace on their own. Second, brands often send mixed messages to factories. On the one 
hand, they demand compliance with the Code of Conduct. On the other hand, they seek to 
squeeze the lowest prices and fastest production times out of factories. These demands, in turn, 
lead to codes violations; a factory cannot pay workers even the minimum wage, for example, if a 
brand isn‘t willing to pay a price consistent with it. The FLA, however, continues to depend on 
internal monitoring programs to carry out the majority of its monitoring work. It focuses on 
ensuring that brands have an infrastructure in place to monitor factories but does not require 
affiliate brands to consider the actions the brand takes—especially in sourcing decisions—that 
push factories towards labor standards violations. 
 
4.3.3. FLA Investigations 
We have shown that the FLA‘s routine external and internal monitoring programs suffer 
from a variety of deficiencies. Now, we consider a third type of investigation undertaken by the 
FLA: investigations based on third-party complaints. Four recent cases are presented here. The 
FLA‘s ongoing investigations into conditions at several apparel factories are considered first. 
Then, we examine the FLA‘s investigation into labor standards for Apple at Foxconn, the 
electronics manufacturer.  
In early 2011, the FLA received a complaint from a Honduran women‘s organization. 
The complaint alleged that almost sixty workers had suffered debilitating injuries at Gildan 
factories due to long shifts, the intense pace of work, and high production targets. Though nearly 
two years have passed since the initiation of the complaint, the FLA has yet to issue a 
preliminary or final report of its findings. A summary of the draft, however, is provided by the 
Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), a Canadian labor and women‘s rights organization. The 
FLA plans to recommend that Gildan increase worker participation in an already existing health 
and safety program. It makes no recommendations concerning root cause operational practices 
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such as the pace of work, the ―4x4‖ work system (wherein workers work four 11.5 hour days and 
take four days off), or production targets. Lynda Yanz, MSN‘s Executive Director, is quoted as 
saying, ―It‘s very unfortunate that the FLA has not undertaken a serious assessment of Gildan‘s 
ergonomics program as well as the impacts of the company‘s production methods on workers‘ 
health.‖104 Yanz is a member of the FLA Board of Directors.  
The FLA is carrying out a similar investigation at Honduran factories supplying FLA 
affiliate Hanesbrands. Though the complaint was filed at the same time as the Gildan 
complaint—March 2011—the investigation was not set to begin until August 2012. The same 
team of investigators used for the Gildan investigation was slated to undertake this investigation. 
The MSN believes it will come to the same conclusions.
105
  
Another FLA investigation into Bratex, a supplier of FLA affiliate Russell Brands/Fruit 
of the Loom has yet to yield any results despite beginning in February 2011. In this case, thirty-
one workers lost their jobs after raising concerns about wages, bonus payments, and their 
freedom to associate. While labor disputes can oftentimes stretch over a long period of time, 
these cases demonstrate that the FLA, after taking years to issue a report, is consistently failing 
to implement meaningful change in the factories it investigates. The Clean Clothes Campaign, a 
European anti-sweatshop initiative, only began to publicize the Bratex case because it no longer 
believed that the FLA and the brands involved could resolve the case in a fair and just manner.
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The FLA makes no mention of the three cases presented here on its website.   
We now turn to the FLA‘s investigation into labor conditions at three Foxconn factories 
producing Apple products in China. Unlike most other labor rights investigations, the FLA‘s 
work for Apple was followed closely by the media. Third-party documentation of the 
investigation, therefore, is plentiful. Moreover, since this was a high-stakes investigation both for 
Apple and the FLA, we can assume that the FLA‘s investigation reflects its best effort.  
After a new set of media reports on labor conditions at Apple‘s suppliers in China led to 
large-scale public outcry against the company in early 2012, Apple affiliated with the FLA. Even 
before the affiliation was official, however, the FLA began an investigation. From February to 
August 2012, the FLA carried out both monitoring and verification investigations at three 
Foxconn factories, issuing widely publicized reports on both. The prompt and public actions 
taken by the FLA in this case stand in stark contrast to the slower and more opaque actions 
observed in the less-widely publicized apparel factory cases discussed above.      
Two FLA external monitors carried out investigations at three Foxconn factories in 
February 2012. The process was closely followed and the FLA president, Auret Van Heerden, 
gave interviews during the investigation, stating, for instance, that Foxconn‘s ―facilities are 
really world class.‖107 The New York Times registered the response of the founder of Verité, an 
FLA-accredited non-profit external monitor: ―That he [van Heerden] would make any comments 
prior to workers being interviewed off-site in a confidential environment is really somewhat 




FLA monitors got a sense of workers‘ attitudes through a survey. Monitors also 
interviewed a small sample of workers. Most of these interviews, however, occurred at the 
factory.  Only 14%, 23%, and 9% of interviews were carried out off-site at the Chengdu, 
Longhuan, and Guanlan facilities, respectively.
109
 Ordinarily, on-site interviews are not a best 
practice because workers are less willing to be frank with monitors that are hired by their 
employers. This is especially troubling in the Foxconn case, however, because of how tense 
employee-management relations are. The monitors found substantial violations relating to safety, 
overtime, overtime compensation, and worker-management relations. Though the FLA code now 
recommends a living wage, no such recommendation was made in this case. Apple and Foxconn 
pledged to implement a remediation plan immediately.  
In late June, 2012, the FLA monitors returned to the factories to verify that these 
problems were being remediated. The quick turnaround—five months—on verification is curious 
in itself. The FLA states in its 2011 annual report that, ― In our experience, a two- to three-year 
period should lapse between the development of a corrective action plan and verification in order 
to evaluate the impact of the more complex verification plans.‖110 Following these audits, the 
monitors reported that ―steady progress has been made at the three facilities…and all 
remediation items due within the timeframe have been completed, with others ahead of 
schedule.‖111  
SACOM, a Chinese labor rights organization, also investigated conditions at six Foxconn 
facilities (including two facilities visited by the FLA) in the first half of 2012. They found that 
workers were forced to sign up to the company-controlled union by management and were 
unaware of the union‘s purpose. Workers reported that managers often used abusive disciplinary 
measures; these measures included, but were not limited to, forcing workers to write and then 
read aloud letters confessing their guilt. Overtime hours required by management were found to 
depend on the product produced in the factory. SACOM investigators found that workers 
producing what was then the newest version of the iPad were forced to work more than 80 hours 
of overtime per month—far in excess of the Chinese legal limit. Though Foxconn initially 
promised that it would cut down on overtime in early 2011, it now promises that it will comply 
with the Chinese legal limit by July 2013. Unpaid overtime work was also a problem. Workers 
had no information concerning the chemicals they use in production and complained that their 
injuries were rarely reported. Only 10% of interviewees were aware of the FLA or its report—
some knew only because management had asked them to prepare for the inspections. In addition 
to not informing workers about the FLA‘s findings, managers warned interviewees not to talk to 
journalists or researchers. This directly contradicts the FLA president‘s claim that, ―Workers are 
very outspoken, they‘re not intimidated at all.‖112 Though SACOM conducted its interviews 




In September 2012, SACOM carried out an investigation at the Foxconn factory in 
Zhengzou. Though the FLA did not investigate Zhengzou, it produces 70% of all iPhone 5s.
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SACOM found that none of the work improvements reported at the Shenzhen factories by the 
 29 
 
FLA verification report had spread to Zhengzou. There they found that required overtime rose to 
illegal levels in order to fill the demand for the new iPhone. Problems with abusive management 
practices, bathroom breaks, and lack of true collective bargaining were also found. In order to 
make up for high worker turnover, local governments have recruitment quotas that must be met 
and educational institutions had to supply students to work as ―interns‖ on as assembly line.115  
Though there has been much dispute as to whether or not these internships are forced on 
students, the FLA verification report stated that Foxconn had made ―significant improvements‖ 
to its internship program. It added that this development would help workers at all factories, not 
just those directly monitored by the FLA.
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 A separate report by Envoyé Spécial, a French 
television program, confirmed SACOM‘s findings from the Zhengzou plant. They interviewed 
student interns who said that they didn‘t desire to work at the factory but were told that they 
would lose their diploma if they did not. The report concluded that the high worker turnover and 
half-built (though inhabited) dormitories they observed were due to demand for the iPhone 5.
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Other reports relating to the internship program‘s use of forced labor and underaged workers 
have emerged in the past few months.
118
    
Many argue that the internship program is a response to Foxconn‘s inability to obtain 
employees for long periods of time—an indication of worker dissatisfaction. More explicit forms 
of dissatisfaction were expressed in late September 2012 at a Foxconn factory producing iPhone 
parts when workers rebelled against harsh treatment doled out by managers and security 
guards.
119
  In October 2012, three to four thousand workers went on strike at the Zhengzou 
iPhone after Apple issued new quality control standards that they could not meet.
120
 On January 
10, 2013, workers at one plant again went on strike, this time for higher wages.
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In its press releases, the FLA gave the impression that both Apple and Foxconn were 
committed to creating safe, equitable workplaces.
122
  Its investigation, however, only covered 
three Foxconn factories during a non-peak production period. As the evidence presented above 
shows, labor conditions at Foxconn factories—not to mention other Apple suppliers123—are far 
from ideal. Many of these problems can be traced back to the demands placed on suppliers by 
Apple. Like the apparel companies already discussed, Apple says it wants to create better 
working conditions but is unwilling to reform its own pricing practices, excessive quality 
standards, and demand for quick deliveries of large quantities of goods. The FLA makes no 
mention of any these factors in either its initial monitoring or verification reports. Many of the 
problems found by the FLA, however, were observed to be directly correlated with Apple‘s 
demand for products. Thus, while the FLA‘s reports helped to placate consumer concerns about 
Apple products, they did little to address the issues at the bottom of the problems they sought to 
solve.  
In this subsection, we examined evidence on the effectiveness of the FLA‘s monitoring 
regime. In the past year alone, several private, for-profit monitors used by the FLA have been 
unable to detect major labor standards violations in a number of high profile cases. Internal brand 
monitors, though well-meaning, are stretched too thin. Their ability to make permanent, positive 
changes to the workplace is hampered by the practices of other parts of the company. Finally, 
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FLA complaint-based investigations go on for years without any updates from the FLA. When 
these reports are released, however, the changes they recommend fail to take into account the 
root cause factors that lead to these problems. The one recent exception to this pattern of slow 
monitoring was the high-profile investigation the FLA undertook at three Foxconn factories. 
Though these investigations were prompt they provided an incomplete picture of labor 
conditions at Foxconn facilities and Apple suppliers in general. Independent investigators found 
more pervasive violations than the FLA and, importantly, found that many of these violations 
were related to Apple‘s sourcing practices. Thus, despite recent changes to the letter of its charter 
and code, the FLA is still failing to implement meaningful, long-lasting changes at the factories 
it monitors. 
 
4.4. The WRC, Universities, and Labor Standards 
We now turn to the work of the WRC and its work with universities to improve labor 
standards. The three cases considered here demonstrate how the WRC is better able to provide 
accurate, timely information to universities about ongoing cases. Universities, in turn, have used 
this information to inform their apparel licensing policies and, ultimately, to influence the 
outcome of investigations. Though the actions taken by universities in these cases may seem 
extreme to some, they speak to how many universities view their relationship to labor standards. 
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—the cases presented here show how, through their work, 
the WRC and universities have helped to bring about new norms in labor standards. 
In 2007, the WRC undertook an investigation of Jerzees de Honduras (JDH), a factory 
owned by Russell Athletic, an FLA affiliate.
124
 The WRC found that managers at JDH had fired 
145 workers for their involvement in forming a union at the factory.
125
  In response to this initial 
report, Russell agreed to reinstate the workers and allow the union to form. In October 2008, 
however, Russell announced that it would close the factory; the announcement came less than a 
week after union negotiations had stalled. The WRC issued another report in early November 
which found that the closure was illegal and motivated by animus towards the union.
126
 After the 
WRC released its report the FLA, which had received the same third-party complaint, undertook 
its own investigation.
127
 Though the FLA-hired private monitors initially found no infractions, it 
commissioned Adrián Goldin, a widely-recognized labor rights expert to write a third report after 
ten labor rights organizations raised objections to the initial investigation. Goldin found that the 
private monitor‘s investigation suffered from serious flaws and concluded that: ―the closure of 
the factory has been determined, at least to a significant extent, by the existence and activity of 
the union.‖128  
During this time the WRC communicated extensively with its university affiliates, 
releasing regular updates on its initial findings and remediation with Russell. When it was 
announced that the factory was to be closed and that the closure was related to the formation of a 
union, the WRC contacted affiliate universities, pointing out that this action violated many of 
their codes of conduct. The WRC did not tell universities what they ought to do; it acted instead 





 It does not appear that the FLA ever publicly communicated with its affiliate 
universities on the matter. At this point several universities began to investigate the case, whether 
it violated their code of conduct, and their relationship with Russell. After deliberating, a few 
universities decided to sever their contracts with Russell. A University of Michigan 
spokesperson told the New York Times that its committee on labor standards ―found that the 
company had not respected the employees‘ right to association and had not adhered to the 
company‘s own standards of conduct…We do not feel that continuing the license is 
appropriate.‖130 In all, almost one hundred schools severed their contracts with Russell from late 
2008 to early 2009, costing the company an estimated $50 million in revenue.
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 Just as 




During this time, the WRC continued to work to report on actions taken by Russell and 
ensure that, if JDH did close down, that the closure was carried out in an orderly fashion and 
without violence. The FLA also began to change its tone on the issue, placing Russell on special 
review in June 2009.
133
 Sometime in 2009, Russell contacted the WRC indicating that it was 
willing to once again negotiate with the union. In late 2009 the parties reached an agreement 
whereby a new factory was opened and workers were reinstated to their positions.
134
  Russell‘s 
decisions were undoubtedly influenced by the actions of universities. An FLA board member 
from the university caucus reported Russell‘s situation after the resolution: ―There was still about 
30 percent [of universities] who had not reinstated their licenses and their [Russell‘s] business is 
still suffering greatly. There is concern that they will never recapture the business to the level 
that they were prior to this incident.‖ While many universities were willing to reexamine their 
contracts with Russell, the same board member noted that its false promises of change in the past 
made them leery of the company‘s statements.135 Fortunately, in its latest verification report the 
WRC found that significant progress has been made in carrying out the agreement.
136
 
A second precedent-setting case where universities played a key role dealt with the 
closing of the Visiontex and Hugger factories in Honduras. In response to a third-party complaint 
about the circumstances of the closure, the WRC undertook an investigation in 2009. The 
resulting report found that both factories were abruptly shut down in January 2009 after Nike—
both factories‘ largest client—declined to renew its contract. The owners fled the factory; failing 
to pay the workers the severance they were owed.
137
 The importance of these payments was 
outlined by Scott Nova, the executive director of the WRC: ―the reason why most of these 
countries mandate that employers pay severance is that there is no other form of social insurance 
to protect workers in the case of job loss. There‘s no unemployment insurance, there‘s no 
welfare, there‘s no food stamps. So when people lose a job, this legally mandated severance is all 
they have to rely upon.‖138 In light of these findings, the WRC urged Nike to compel its 
subcontractors—which were still solvent and operating—to pay the amount legally owed to the 
workers. The FLA declined to take up the case. 
Though Nike concurred with the WRC on the facts of the case, it declined to take action. 





 If this were the case, then Nike did not violate any university‘s 
code of conduct, which can only apply to apparel bearing the university logo. Constant pressure 
from university students and officials, however, caused Nike to take small actions to help the 
workers. In March 2010, however, the WRC reported that its investigators had found that Nike 
was, indeed, manufacturing university apparel at Hugger and Visiontex. As the WRC pointed out 
in its report, Nike had attempted to use a similar tactic in a 2008 case regarding a factory in 
Malaysia.
140
 In the wake of this report, two universities ended their contract with Nike and 
several others threatened to follow suit.
141
 As in the Russell case, the participation of universities 
made it costly for Nike to ignore the plight of the workers. The WRC kept universities up to date 
on what was happening in Honduras, finding information that otherwise would have never come 
to light. As a result of this pressure, in July 2010 Nike agreed to pay $1.54 million in severance 
to workers, among other concessions.
142
 This was the first case of its type. While companies had 
previously agreed to pressure their subcontractors to pay severance (the line of action that the 
Hugger and Visiontex workers and WRC were asking for), no brand had ever paid direct 
severance to workers.  
The significance of the Hugger/Visiontex case is best understood in the context of later 
cases. Nike, at least, now understood that it was on the hook when its suppliers failed their 
workers. When the owners of the PT Kizone factory in Indonesia fled, it was Nike who reported 
to the WRC that none of the factory‘s 2,800 workers had received their severance payments. The 
brand, moreover, paid $500,000 to the workers and compelled two other entities to pay $1.055 
million more.
143
 Other brands, such as Adidas, however, refused to contribute, using many of the 
same tactics Nike used in the Hugger/Visiontex case.
144




While, ideally, the owners of supplier factories would pay the severances legally owed to 
their workers, this rarely happens. Without the pressure universities placed on brands, workers in 
all three of the factories discussed would have never received any severance. In cases such as 
these, universities play the role of moral compass, insisting that brands take action even if they 
are not technically required to do so. For example, in his letter to Adidas announcing the 
university‘s decision to sever ties with the brand, Georgetown‘s Vice President for Public Affairs 
wrote: 
 
As a Catholic and Jesuit university, deeply committed to the dignity of all persons 
and human labor, Georgetown University is steadfast in its commitment to 
improving the working conditions and lives of workers involved in the production 




Robert L. Barchi, President of Rutgers, took a similar stance when he announced that the 
university had cut its contract with Adidas in November 2012: ―Adidas' refusal to acknowledge 
its responsibilities...is not consistent with the values of this university."
147
 Ethically-based 
decisions such as these can then force brands to reevaluate their operating practices. In the PT 
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Kizone case, Nike decided to pay workers directly. Brands can also keep track of factories that 
are likely to suddenly close (e.g. after a major client cuts its contract) and ensure that suppliers 
have enough funds set aside in the case of a closure. The ultimate goal of all of these efforts is to 
find ways to ensure that relations between workers and brands are firmly within the bounds of 
national and international law. Without outside prompting from well-respected, influential 
entities such as universities, however, it is doubtful that any progress would ever be made. 
By discussing the actions of these other universities, we may have given the impression 
that WRC affiliation necessarily involves cutting contracts and the like. It should be stressed that 
this is not the case. The WRC merely provides information to university affiliates and allows 
them to act on that information in whatever manner they deem fitting. The point of discussing 
these cases was to consider how other universities understand their responsibilities with regard to 
labor standards and, more importantly, to show that the WRC is more than just a traditional 
monitoring organization. Instead of simply policing factories for infractions to a code of conduct, 
the WRC seeks to understand and fix the underlying factors within a given factory and the wider 
apparel industry that lead to these infractions. While some brands may be unwilling to confront 
these problems at first, the steady, constructive pressure the WRC and its university affiliates 
place on brands can cause these brands reconsider how they do business.  
 
5. Conclusion: Labor Standards and Pitt  
At the outset of this paper, we set ourselves the task of showing that the Worker Rights 
Consortium was a more effective labor rights monitoring organization than the Fair Labor 
Association. What evidence has been presented to support this claim? First, we examined the 
policies and practices of the FLA and WRC. We found that, over the past ten years, the trend has 
been for the FLA to attempt to catch up to the standards adopted by the WRC from its founding. 
The FLA‘s Code of Conduct long lacked strong wage provisions and language protecting 
workers‘ freedom to associate. Though it recently amended its Code in a way that brought it 
closer in line with the policies of the WRC and other labor rights organizations, it is by no means 
watertight. For example, despite its own forceful arguments that workers‘ wages may not reflect 
productivity and, in general, be unfair, the FLA has yet to do anything to advocate living wages 
in the factories it monitors.  
Of course, these standards mean nothing if the organization is not able to implement a 
successful monitoring program. The FLA continues to rely on internal and external monitors to 
carry out quick due diligence audits. These monitors often lack the time and skills necessary to 
diagnose labor issues in factories, let alone see to it that the remediation they mandate is 
permanent and actually helps workers. The WRC, on the other hand, undertakes longer 
investigations that focus on the underlying problems that lead to poor labor conditions. The 
WRC is better able to implement lasting change at a factory because it uses the skills and 
resources of the surrounding community to understand the situation and, more importantly, to 
build the community‘s capacity to solve labor problems on its own in the future.  
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Though these differences may seem paltry in the abstract, they lead to starkly different 
outcomes. The cases examined in section 4 showed that FLA monitoring model has failed to help 
workers in the factories it audits. Part of this, no doubt, has to do with the inability of monitors to 
find and report all violations during their short visits. Even if these monitors could catch every 
violation in the course of an audit and write up a comprehensive remediation plan, though, it is 
unlikely that this would lead to any lasting change. For, at the same time these demands to 
remediate are being made, the sourcing departments of the very same brands are demanding that 
the supplier deliver more products, faster, and at the lowest prices possible. When suppliers are 
squeezed like this, is it any surprise that they continue to violate their own Codes of Conduct?  
We argued that the ineffectiveness of the FLA stems not from some sinister plot but, 
rather, from organizational inertia. Brands simply want to maintain control over their business. A 
negative side-effect of this desire, however, is that, by maintaining control, they fail to make the 
operational changes necessary to improve labor standards in the factories from which they source 
their goods. Unfortunately, the FLA has by and large played the role of enabler to these brands. 
The WRC, on the other hand, is an organization that has consistently stuck to its principles and 
successfully pushed brands to actually follow through on their stated values. 
With this evidence in mind, we can confidently conclude that the WRC is, in fact, a more 
effective labor rights monitoring organization than the FLA. This, then, completes our argument. 
Pitt cares about the conditions under which its branded apparel is produced and, therefore, joins 
labor rights monitoring organizations. Given a choice between more and less effective 
organizations, Pitt should at least affiliate with the more effective one. The WRC is a more 
effective organization than the FLA. Pitt therefore, ought to affiliate with the WRC.  
Of course, by affiliating with the WRC or any other organization, Pitt-branded apparel 
will not suddenly become sweat-free. At the same time, affiliating with the WRC is more than 
just a symbolic act. By becoming an affiliate university of the WRC, Pitt will have partnered 
with an organization that understands the challenges involved in improving labor standards and 
has a proven track record of doing so. An organization, moreover, that as attuned to the problems 
facing workers who produce as it is to the moral and operational dilemmas faced by the 
universities and consumers. No, WRC affiliation is not a cure-all; it is, however, one significant 
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